

Archives
Closed
LD
175
.A40K
Th
112

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND WILLIE P. MANGUM

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Social Studies
Appalachian State Teachers College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Edith Josephine Houston

May 1960

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND WILLIE P. MANGUM

By

Edith Josephine Houston

Approved by:

J. C. Yoder
Chairman of Thesis Advisory Committee

Eratis Williams
Director of Graduate Study

William S. Hoffmann
Major Professor

John S. Barden
Minor Professor

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND WILLIE P. MANGUM

An Abstract of a Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of Social Studies

Appalachian State Teachers College

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Edith Josephine Houston

May, 1960

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND WILLIE P. MANGUM

THESIS ABSTRACT

It was the purpose of this study to write a descriptive account of the influence of the Bank of the United States on an important North Carolina politician, Willie P. Mangum, and to explain the motives for his change of policy.

The procedure used was the historical method of research. Major secondary sources dealing with the Jacksonian period, special studies emphasizing the Bank of the United States, Willie P. Mangum, North Carolina politics, and various histories of North Carolina were examined and studied. The thesis was based mainly on primary sources, especially the collected letters of and to Willie P. Mangum.

This study shows that Mangum was a rather typical politician and political expediency generally determined the course he would follow. He was elected to the United States Senate as a supporter of Andrew Jackson and until the end of 1833 he was regarded as a Jackson supporter. Although Mangum personally favored the Bank of the United States, political expediency caused him to support Jackson and in 1832 he twice voted against the Bank's recharter. From this time on Mangum was subjected to heavy pressure from the conservatives in North Carolina urging him to support the Bank. In late 1833 Jackson, through the Secretary of the Treasury,

Roger B. Taney, transferred the federal deposits from the Bank of the United States to certain state banks, known as "pet banks." Increased pressure was put on Mangum from supporters of the Bank. Mangum's correspondents pointed out that the Bank of the United States saved merchants large sums of money on exchange, checked inflation and provided a sound currency. Many of the Bank supporters were seriously concerned by the economic adjustments which Jackson's policy was causing, and they would lose large sums of money if Jackson succeeded in destroying the Bank of the United States. The Bank supporters formed a "money power" which threatened to dominate the state. This party was ready to turn on Mangum so he shifted his course and became a supporter of the Bank of the United States, a leader in the Whig party and an opponent of Andrew Jackson.

It was concluded that the Bank issue was economic, as well as political and emotional. There was much in the Bank war that was emotional or partisan, but the economic factors were there also, and it was these factors that were most significant in causing Mangum to support the Bank and oppose Jackson.

DEDICATION

To my major professor, Dr. William S. Hoffmann, for his encouragement, inspiration, very generous assistance, scholarly suggestions, and guidance in organizing and improving the study as it progressed, I dedicate this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Grateful appreciation is hereby made to my Social Studies advisors, Dr. Julian Yoder, Chairman of the committee, and Mrs. Ina Van Noppen for their scholarly advice, constructive criticisms and their encouragement while directing this thesis.

Acknowledgement is also made to Dr. John G. Barden for his very helpful suggestions in preparation and organization of the data.

The writer would like to express appreciation to the librarians of Appalachian State Teachers College, who have given their complete cooperation in securing and supplying needed data.

The writer is also indebted to Mr. Brownlee Waschek and Mrs. Rena Hoover who proof-read the thesis and made many helpful suggestions.

ERASE
COTTON CONTENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE PROBLEM AND PLAN OF ORGANIZATION	1
The Problem	1
Statement of the problem	1
Importance of the study	1
Plan of Organization	3
Purpose	3
Method of Research	3
The Thesis	4
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	6
Special Studies	6
State Histories	7
Interpretative Histories	9
Accounts of Mangum	11
Source of Material	12
III. WILLIE P. MANGUM AND NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS . .	13
Biographical Sketch of Willie P. Mangum . . .	15
Mangum and North Carolina Politics in 1824 . .	20
National Politics and Willie P. Mangum . . .	22
The Election of 1828	24
Mangum's Election to the United States Senate.	25
The Early Senate Career of Mangum	27

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. REACTION TO THE BANK VETO	29
History of the Bank of the United States . . .	29
Attitude Toward the Bank in North Carolina and the United States	31
Introduction of Bill to Recharter the Bank . .	34
Mangum's Attitude Toward the Recharter Bill . .	36
Jackson's Reaction and Veto of the Recharter Bill	39
Reaction in North Carolina to the Veto	40
Reaction of Mangum's Correspondents to the Veto	41
The Election of 1832	42
In the United States	42
In North Carolina	43
Mangum's Part in the Election	43
Jackson's Feeling Toward the Bank as a Result of His Election	45
V. JACKSON REMOVES DEPOSITS AND MANGUM SHIFTS HIS COURSE	47
Mangum's Wavering Loyalty to Jackson	47
Mangum and the Nullification Crisis	48
Withdrawal of Deposits	53
Action of People of North Carolina Concerning the Transfer of Deposits	54

CHAPTER	PAGE
Mangum Suggest that Friends of the Bank	
Oppose Removal of Deposits	55
Mangum's Decission to Desert Jackson	59
VI. LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION	60
Mangum's Relationship to Burke County	
Instructions	61
Mangum and the Election of 1834 in North	
Carolina	64
Mangum and the Censure of President Jackson .	67
Resolutions from North Carolina to State	
Senators to Support Benton's Resolution . .	70
Refusal by Mangum to Follow Instructions . . .	71
Reaction of Mangum's Friends concerning	
Instructions	73
Mangum's Resignation	74
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	76
Summary	76
Conclusions	78
BIBLIOGRAPHY	80

MILLERS FALLS

LEVERETT

COTTON CONFECTION

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND PLAN OF ORGANIZATION

Many students of North Carolina history have noted that for the period of the 1830's studies by historians have failed to show the connection between certain national issues and their effect upon the politics of the state. Neither do these studies show the reaction exerted by certain key political leaders during this period. An adequate interpretation of these events and leaders can be made only from specific studies of this period.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. It was the purpose of this study to gather material and to write a descriptive account of the influence of the Bank of the United States on Willie P. Mangum, one of the most important leaders in North Carolina politics during the 1830's, and to explain the motives for his sudden changes of policy.

Importance of the study. Of the studies dealing with North Carolina history in the 1830's none adequately shows the influence of banking and politics upon the history of the state. Neither do the studies show the reaction of North Carolina's most important political leaders to the issues concerning the national bank. In this study an attempt was

made to analyze critically the general histories of North Carolina as well as the special studies dealing with this period.

By tracing the direct influence of a specific issue, such as the national bank, on a specific political leader one can more accurately interpret the influence of one upon the other. Most of the interpretative histories of the Jacksonian period seem to be based on the author's views toward economic institutions rather than based on the influence of these economic institutions on the politicians of the day. The importance of this study is not to prove that the national bank was good or bad, but to show how it influenced a specific politician.

Willie P. Mangum is an excellent politician to study for a number of reasons. First, he was one of the most important politicians who was active in North Carolina in the 1830's. Second, he seems to be a typical Southern Whig. Third, adequate sources of information concerning Mangum and his political career are readily available.

The explanation of Mangum and his actions are not simple. He was not on the payroll of the bank. Neither was he a man who had been personally harmed by the bank. His motivation was complex. If one can understand the complex feelings and actions of Willie P. Mangum toward the national bank, one will be in a position really to understand how this

controversial institution affected Mangum as it did. A careful and thorough-going study of the reaction of important political leaders enable one to understand the events that took place and their effects upon national leaders.

II. PLAN OF ORGANIZATION

In attempting to show the influence of banking and politics upon North Carolina and the reaction of Willie P. Mangum to the national bank, the writer examined and studied major secondary sources dealing with the Jacksonian period: special studies emphasizing the national bank, Willie P. Mangum, North Carolina politics; various histories of North Carolina; correspondence of selected political leaders, and the letters and speeches of Willie P. Mangum.

For a report which is primarily concerned with the political situation from 1824 to 1836 it became necessary to obtain a great amount of material from various libraries throughout the state to supplement material found in the library of Appalachian State Teachers College.

Some notes were taken from all sources examined. Intensive notes were gathered from the recorded correspondence of Mangum and his associates. The notes collected by William S. Hoffmann were also used.

The Thesis. Chapters one and two include a statement of the problem, purpose of the study, and a review of the literature.

The body of the thesis begins with chapter three, which traces the career of Willie P. Mangum and emphasizes his relationship to the issues of the national bank. The chapter places Mangum in his setting as a leader in North Carolina politics and includes a brief summary of Mangum's early life, early politics, and election to the United States Senate.

Jackson's veto of the bill rechartering the Bank of the United States and the reaction of Mangum and his political friends in North Carolina are taken up in chapter four.

Chapter five deals with Mangum's reaction to Jackson's removal of the deposits from the national bank. It also emphasizes the feelings of many North Carolinians who opposed withdrawal of funds and assesses or evaluates their feelings concerning it. This chapter is primarily concerned with Mangum's desertion of Jackson.

The sixth chapter shows Mangum's role as a leader of the forces opposing Jackson and the continuing fight in North Carolina over the removal of national funds from the Bank of the United States and the depositing of them in various state banks.

In the concluding chapter an attempt is made to discover Mangum's real views and to explain the causes of his various actions. There is also an attempt to evaluate the economic importance of the bank issues as they affected the people of a typical Southern State.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Much has been written concerning the Bank of the United States. Most of the interpretative historians who have written about the Jacksonian period give particular emphasis to the problems concerning the national bank. The comprehensive histories of North Carolina at least touch on the national bank or refer to Mangum's shift in politics. The special studies generally either fail to relate properly the activities of individual political leaders toward the bank or treat them as if they were not affected by economic motives.

Special Studies. Probably the best special study dealing with North Carolina politics in the 1820's and 1830's is W. S. Hoffmann's Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics. It is a thorough, extensively documented account of North Carolina. After discussing the political fight concerning the national bank, Hoffmann concludes, "the issue was political and emotional, not economic."¹

Charles G. Sellers, generally regarded by reputable historians as the outstanding authority on national politics

¹William S. Hoffmann, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1958), p. 80.

of the Jacksonian period, in an otherwise favorable review of Hoffmann's work questions Hoffmann's assertion that economic aspects of the national bank were inconsequential.²

Earlier special studies concerning currency and banking and federal politics in North Carolina were written by William K. Boyd. He concludes that "sound financial policies were one of the fundamental bases of the Whig party in North Carolina."³

State Histories. Perhaps the most comprehensive of the state studies is The History of a Southern State: North Carolina by Hugh T. Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome. The writers stated that "the dominant wing" of the group opposing Jackson consisted of "the National Republicans devoted to Henry Clay's nationalistic, constructive program of internal improvements, protective tariff and national bank."⁴ They did not expand their statement fully or show Mangum's relationship to the banking issue.

²Charles G. Sellers, "Book Reviews," Journal of Southern History, XXV (January, 1959), 117.

³William K. Boyd, "Currency and Banking in North Carolina: 1790-1836," Historical Papers (Durham: Trinity College Historical Society, 1914), IV, 86; also "Federal Politics in North Carolina: 1824-1836," South Atlantic Quarterly XVIII (January-April, 1919), 41-51, 161-174.

⁴Hugh T. Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), p. 328.

Daniel J. Whitener in his North Carolina History asserts that "many of the Piedmont and Mountain farmers and traders on the coast joined the Whig Party because the planters controlled the Democratic Party."⁵ While this statement is true, Whitener does not go deeply into the motivations of the leading politicians.

Archibald Henderson's North Carolina: The Old North State and the New shows that:

Mangum refused to attend the congressional caucus of 1824, but when the election of the President was thrown into the House he went with the majority of representatives from his state in support of Crawford. His explanation of this vote was a forecast of the independence he exhibited ten years later: "It is my first wish to discharge conscientiously my duty to myself and my country in all public trusts--and the second wish of my heart would be to have my course approved by those whose interest are placed in my keeping."⁶

Henderson does not go deeply into Mangum's general motivation or discuss his relationship to the banking issue. An assertion that any politician is merely doing his "conscientious duty" is hardly a complete explanation of his action.

R. D. W. Conner emphasized the prestige which the Whig Party has gained for itself in North Carolina: Rebuilding

⁵Daniel J. Whitener, North Carolina History (Chattanooga: Harlow Publishing Corporation, 1958), p. 127.

⁶Archibald Henderson, North Carolina: The Old North State and the New (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1941), II, 80.

an Ancient Commonwealth. Connor's study makes only a brief comment on the national bank issue and ignores Mangum's role.⁷

Interpretive Histories. Frederick Jackson Turner's The United States 1830-1850 points out that Jackson's war on the bank typified the western frontiersman's desire for democracy and easy money.⁸

Richard Hofstadter gave an interesting twist to the subject when he asserted that Jackson's war on the bank represented the "entrepreneurial class" fight against an entrenched monopoly.⁹

A very controversial work concerning the administration of Jackson is Schlesinger's Age of Jackson. His thesis is that Jacksonian Democracy represented the struggle of laboring men from the East to control monopoly.¹⁰

Charles A. Beard asserts that Jackson's anti-bank fight represented an alignment of the laboring class, the

⁷R. D. W. Connor, North Carolina: Rebuilding an Ancient Commonwealth (Chicago: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1929), I, 554.

⁸Frederick Jackson Turner, The United States 1830-1850 (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1935), 302 pp.

⁹Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 378 pp.

¹⁰Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 577 pp.

farmers of the West and the southern slave owners against the financial and industrial interest of New England and the Middle Atlantic states.¹¹

An interesting and detailed account of the politics of this period is given in James K. Polk: Jacksonian by Charles Sellers.¹² The same author in his article "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" illustrates the growth and development of the Whig party. He points out that writers such as Arthur C. Cole and U. B. Phillips do not give a true picture of the Whig party. According to Sellers the Whig party was actually molded into shape during the 23rd Congress (1833-1835) "in which it gained the allegiance of fifty-two of the ninety-nine southern members of the House."¹³ Also he emphasizes that while the

Whig party in the South did not begin as, and did not become a state rights party, it is necessary to add that neither was it consciously nationalistic. State rights versus nationalism simply was not the main issue in Southern politics in this period.¹⁴

From various studies Sellers suggests that the Whig party in the South was built around a nucleus of National Republicans

¹¹Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1933), I, 824 pp.

¹²Charles G. Sellers, Jr., James K. Polk: Jacksonian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 526 pp.

¹³Charles G. Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" American Historical Review LIX (January, 1954), p. 338.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 340.

and state rights men, but received its greatest accession of strength from business-minded Democrats who deserted Jackson on the bank issue. Sellers states that:

the Whig party in the South was controlled by urban commercial and banking interests, supported by a majority of the planters who were economically dependent on banking and commercial facilities.¹⁵

Sellers' article has some very logical reasoning behind it, and certainly is at least partially accurate. Yet the article is based heavily on supposition and lacks proof. Sellers' article was written before Hoffmann's book was published, and he mentioned the need for further study to secure evidence to substantiate his conclusions.

Accounts of Mangum. Although there have been no full length biographies of Mangum there are several shorter biographical accounts of this outstanding politician.

Probably the best account of Mangum is found in the biographical sketch by Dr. Henry T. Shanks which appears in Volume I of the Papers of Willie P. Mangum.¹⁶

Penelope McDuffie made a study of Mangum's life up to 1836. "Chapters in the Life of Willie P. Mangum," shows us

¹⁵Ibid., p. 346.

¹⁶Henry T. Shanks (ed.), The Papers of Willie P. Mangum (Raleigh: State Department of Archives of History, 1956), I, 613 pp.

some of the lesser known things about the prominent Senator from North Carolina.¹⁷

Stephen B. Weeks in the Biographical History of North Carolina points out that:

The whole of Judge Mangum's life was spent in the service of his State. . . . As a campaigner he has seldom had an equal in the state, for he was subtle and persuasive and skillful as a diacletian. His superior among North Carolina speakers has never appeared.¹⁸

In various sketches of Mangum not much emphasis is given to the national bank issue and its effect upon North Carolina politics.

Source Material. The Papers of Willie P. Mangum, edited by Henry T. Shanks contain almost every existing letter written by Mangum or written to him. If properly interpreted, it thus provides a researcher with rather full evidence concerning Mangum's thinking. It also includes some important speeches made by Mangum. The letters and speeches are filled with references to the national bank.

Other sources used include letters to Mangum's political friends and rivals. These are found in Trinity College Annual Publications and The North Carolina Historical Review.

¹⁷Penelope McDuffie, "Chapters in the Life of Willie P. Mangum," Historical Papers (Durham: Duke University Press, 1925), XV, 54 pp.

¹⁸S. B. Weeks, "Willie P. Mangum," Biographical History of North Carolina (Greensboro: C. L. Van Noppen, 1905), V, 254.

CHAPTER III

WILLIE P. MANGUM AND NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS

"It is to the people, the real people; not office holders or contractors; . . . that I look for the public sentiment,"¹ shouted North Carolina senator Willie P. Mangum during a bitter Senate debate in 1834.

If I do not mistake the signs of the times [except] for a small party . . . with its heart upon loaves and fishes and fleshpots and all those good things that come in the train of power [no one] defends the violent and lawless seizure of deposits.²

Throughout the whole of North Carolina Mangum continued, the people unanimously opposed Andrew Jackson's transference of the deposits from the national bank. In a bitter protest against the Jackson administration Mangum declared that all except those who were tools of Martin Van Buren regarded the removal of the deposits as the worst lawlessness in their memory.³ He thus for the first time openly and completely placed himself among the leaders of the emerging Whig party that was opposing Andrew Jackson.

¹Shanks, op. cit., V, 565.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Willie P. Mangum had been one of the most "chameleon-like figures"⁴ in North Carolina politics. He had frequently changed his political views but was always ardent in causes in which political expediency dictated that he was champion. He began his career as a staunch Federalist. However, he was quick to assert Republican principles when he needed the votes of the Republican farmers in his country. While a member of the state legislature he received the support of the dominant faction of North Carolina politicians in his quest for state offices and a seat in Congress. In 1824 he and other members of the dominant group supported William H. Crawford for President and opposed Andrew Jackson. In disapproval of the policies for which John Quincy Adams stood, Mangum in 1826 stated that if his group could find "no better"⁵ candidate they would throw their support to Jackson. They could find "no better" candidate so in 1828 Mangum became an elector and an ardent supporter of the man whom he had violently opposed in 1824. Even though Mangum disapproved of many of the things which Jackson did, as long as it was to his advantage to remain a Jackson supporter he did so. In the year 1830 he won for himself a seat in the United States Senate as a result of various political maneuvers, continued support of

⁴W. S. Hoffmann, "Willie P. Mangum and the Whig Revival of the Doctrine of Instructions," Journal of Southern History XXII (August, 1956), 339.

⁵Shanks, op. cit., I, 268.

Jackson, and opposition to all federal internal improvements. While a member of the Senate Mangum privately declared the Bank of the United States an "indispensable necessity"⁶ but at the same time voted twice against its recharter. Mangum's personal feeling during the nullification crisis seemed to be on the side of South Carolina but because his home state thought of nullification as a "species of treason"⁷ he publicly denounced the movement. Critics of Mangum have repeatedly pointed out that, "There is no politician in the state who cannot remember the period when Mr. Mangum had not been upon his side and upon the other also."⁸

Like all men, Mangum was a product of his heredity and environment. He was born on May 10, 1792 in what was then Orange County, but is now incorporated in Durham County. It was here that his father, William Person Mangum, owned a plantation and a country store. William Person Mangum and Catherine Davis Mangum were the parents of three sons, the youngest, Walter Avis, a businessman, Priestly Hinton, a

⁶Shanks, op. cit., I, 456.

⁷William S. Hoffmann, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1958), p. 58.

⁸J. G. De Roulhac Hamilton, Party Politics in North Carolina (Durham: Seeman Printery, 1916) p. 72.

lawyer, and the "golden child"⁹ of the family Willie Person, the eldest. Mangum's name is pronounced "Wiley, after the fashion in North Carolina in those days. No one seems to have misunderstood it and only occasionally a letter was addressed to Wiley P. Mangum."¹⁰

In his youth Mangum began laying the foundation for his later political career. As a clerk in his father's country store he developed a conversational style and personality which were to play an important part in shaping his political future. Hillsboro Academy under the supervision of Reverend Andrew Flinn provided for part of Willie Person's early educational experiences. John Chavis, a free Negro Presbyterian minister, also had a part in Mangum's boyhood education. From Fayetteville Academy Mangum transferred to Raleigh Academy, which was headed by Reverend William McPheeters. Later after study at the University of North Carolina Mangum was asked to return to Raleigh to teach. While at the University he met and became a friend of such people as James K. Polk, John H. Bryan, and Richard Dobbs Spaight, Jr. who were later greatly to affect his political career. Mangum's background was typical of that of rising politicians during this period.

⁹Penelope McDuffie, "Chapters in the Life of Willie P. Mangum," Historical Papers (Durham: Duke University Press, 1925), p. 12.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 11.

In 1815 after graduation from the University of North Carolina he began the study of law under the direction of Duncan Cameron, "one of the most progressive leaders of the state."¹¹ Mangum proved to be a brilliant student and in 1817 received his license to practice law before the Superior Courts of Law and the Courts of Equity in the State of North Carolina.¹² He then followed the circuit courts. His voice had a quality which commanded attention and with his habit of helping the helpless and inexperienced he soon developed a practice of considerable scope. In a letter Mangum tells of his law practice.

I have made a good deal of money this spring, say upwards of \$1900 in actual receipts, and nearly that sum in good bonds & accts. My prospects in the practice continue to grow more flattering.¹³

Riding the circuit and arguing legal cases were not enough to satisfy the young lawyer, and his thoughts turned to love. In the spring of 1819 Mangum wrote his brother that he might be married in the summer, but he was not certain at that time. While at Judge Henry Seawell's, he continued, "I offered a heart not worth two-pence upon the shrine of beauty-- Whether it will be an acceptable offering [,] I can't say whether or not the sacrifice to me is cheap--"¹⁴ Six months

¹¹Shanks, op. cit., I, xvii.

¹²Ibid., I, 9.

¹³Ibid., I, 14.

¹⁴Ibid., I, 16.

later, in September 1819, Mangum married Charity A. Cain. Her father was a large land owner and possessed a large number of slaves. He also maintained a profitable mercantile establishment.¹⁵ Later Mangum turned to his father-in-law many times because of financial difficulties.

The young bridegroom's associates were frequently politicians and Mangum, too, entered politics. In 1818 and again in 1819 Mangum was elected to the State House of Commons where he served on the judicial and educational committees with Archibald Murphey. The response to his first term in the legislature proved to be a favorable one. He wrote his brother "I cannot believe that my strength has all diminished, since last year. & that I could go to Congress without difficulty I entertain no doubt."¹⁶ He considered running for Congress, but he felt it unwise to seek such a position at that time and instead accepted a position as judge of the Superior Court.

His duties as judge carried him into the Western part of North Carolina. He was unwell and complained,

I am not at all pleased with my new profession--it requires more intense labour, more awful responsibility, and it is in every respect less suited to my circumstances and my disposition.¹⁷

He continues in another letter,

¹⁵Ibid., I, xvi.

¹⁶Ibid., I, 15.

¹⁷Ibid., I, 21.

My labours have been most arduous, indeed the intellectual labour of this circuit for unremitted application & difficulty has transcended all that I should have performed in 12 months at the Bar.--¹⁸

After a year of service he resigned giving "poor health"¹⁹ as his reason. He was criticized severely for his resignation and as a result he was defeated when he sought re-election as judge several years later.

Close to the end of 1822 Mangum again considered running for Congress. As attorney and judge he had visited the various court houses and made friends to promote his campaign. His personality was one which appealed to many people. William A. Graham says he was

particularly good on the hustings where he had but few equals in our country . . . his tall and commanding figure always becomingly dressed, his rich and melodious voice . . . his sympathetic nature, and perfect acquaintance with all the springs and motives of human action, gave him an almost mesmeric sway over the multitude.²⁰

Mangum supported the demand for internal improvements and a more democratic state constitution in preparation for his candidacy for Congress. Having laid the foundation stones Mangum announced his candidacy for Congress on June 4, 1823 with Daniel L. Barringer as his opponent. Mangum defeated

¹⁸Ibid., I, 24.

¹⁹Ibid., I, xviii.

²⁰Ibid., I, xix.

Barringer 2,523 to 1,729.²¹ His victory made Mangum a national figure and a recognized leader of the state.

While a congressman, Mangum made important friends. He became closely associated with Nathaniel Macon, the recognized leader of the state's rights faction in the state and the nation's most ardent champion of the doctrine of limited federal government and strict interpretation of the constitution.

During Mangum's first term as Congressman he played a conspicuous part in the tariff debates and voted against the Tariff of 1824. He also showed opposition to federal aid for internal improvements. Though Macon had originally favored constitutional theories, Mangum was more representative of his state, had a fuller understanding of its needs and came to act as interpreter of his constituents to national leaders.²¹

Much of Mangum's time and attention during his first term in Congress was devoted to the presidential election of 1824. During the election, Mangum along with Macon and most of the other leaders of the dominant faction in North Carolina supported William H. Crawford. They had declared that they would support the candidate who should receive the nomination

²¹Ibid., I, xx.

²²McDuffie, op. cit., p. 27.

of the Republican caucus. Every politician assumed that Crawford would receive the caucus nomination.

A rival faction in the state opposed Crawford, denounced the caucus, and formed a "People's Party." At first the candidate of the People's Party was John C. Calhoun. There were many people in the state who wanted Andrew Jackson for President and when events outside North Carolina made it appear that Calhoun could not win the Presidency, the People's Party arranged to support an electoral ticket of Jackson for President and Calhoun for Vice President. Mangum had been on the verge of shifting to Jackson when he was warned that his action would cause him to be regarded as a turncoat. Mangum reaffirmed his support of Crawford and found that this strengthened him.²³ After a hectic campaign the People's Party electors defeated Crawford's ticket in North Carolina by 20,414 to 15,621.²⁴ Despite the defeat Mangum and his group were still the strongest political faction in North Carolina.

Since Jackson did not receive a majority of the nation's electoral votes the House of Representatives was required to

²³Shanks, op. cit., I, 207.

²⁴Albert Ray Newsome, The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: The James Sprunt Studies in Political Science, 1939), XXIII, 46-61, 123-129.

choose the President. Mangum participated in many discussions concerning the candidate to whom North Carolina congressmen should give their support.

The supporters of Crawford saw that their leader had little chance to win the election before the House. Mangum acting as spokesman for the group declared that "none of Crawford's friends from North Carolina will move unless all move. They will act with perfect harmony, & en masse."²⁵ By January rumors were circulating that Henry Clay would give his support to Adams in exchange for some high position in the government. Clay did support Adams and the New Englander won the election on the first ballot. But Mangum and nine others in the North Carolina Congressional delegation remained in support of Crawford.

In general throughout the nation Adams' election with Clay's support served as a signal for all politicians to choose sides and either support Jackson or the Clay-Adams coalition. Yet in North Carolina Crawford's former supporters at first took no stand.

Despite Crawford's defeat his supporters found that early championship of the "Hero of New Orleans" was not essential to political success and they did not suffer a serious political setback, because of their stand. Despite a bitter attack from supporters of Jackson, Mangum won

²⁵Shanks, op. cit., I, 161.

re-election to Congress in 1825 defeating Jacksonian Josiah Crudup by 56 votes.²⁶

By 1826 the Crawford men had still not chosen sides and Mangum declared,

The Crawford men will have to stand aloof . . . from all political considerations having relation to the next presidency--and support or oppose . . . as judgement may dictate.²⁷

By April, 1826, the Southern Crawford men had decided to "unite to put down Adams and if they could get no better for the purpose they will take up General Jackson."²⁸

As time went on, Mangum became opposed to the Adams' administration, and opposed everything for which the administration stood. He joined forces to wreck the Panama Congress, and he opposed Daniel Webster's bill for reorganization of the judiciary, because it would impose federal jurisdiction at the expense of the state courts. Willie wrote his wife on April 8, 1826, "I feel but little pleasure in any of my employments, everything here goes on against my judgement."²⁹ So during the summer of 1826 he sought an appointment as judge of the Superior Court. His appointment was made on

²⁶W. S. Hoffmann, Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), p. 9.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Shanks, op. cit., I, 268.

²⁹Ibid.

August 18 of that same year. Politically it was probably a mistake that he did not immediately give up his seat in Congress, because he was severely criticized for it later. The following December (because of this criticism) the legislature refused to re-elect him judge.

Mangum was out of politics in 1827-1828 except for the presidential campaign when he served as elector on the Jackson ticket. The hostility which he felt toward Clay and Adams drove him to support the "Hero of New Orleans." He was following the sentiment of his state in his shift to Jackson, and he was still working closely with Macon and the dominant faction in North Carolina.

The charge of "corrupt bargain" against Clay and Adams led partisans to choose sides and to support or denounce the Adams' administration. However, the great majority of the people were little concerned over the election to come, so the Presidential campaign of 1828 did not begin in earnest until the autumn of 1827.

The campaign consisted primarily of a series of charges and counter-charges, condemnations and denials. For four years the Jackson men had reiterated the charge that a "corrupt bargain" had brought the administration to power. . . .³⁰

As far as the Jackson men were concerned, the break of the campaign came when Henry Clay declared that if God should find

³⁰Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 20.

it necessary to "chastise" America, it was preferable for him to send "War . . . Pestilence . . . [or] Famine" than to allow "military rule or a blind enthusiasm for mere military renown." The difference between the two candidates seemed to be that "Jackson would sacrifice himself to save the country . . . , and Adams would sacrifice the country to save himself."³¹ When the election returns came in Jackson's popular vote exceeded the total number of votes in 1824. The election proved to be a great personal victory for Jackson. The voters swept "Old Hickory" into the White House by a landslide of 139,212 popular votes.³²

By the end of the 1828 presidential election the criticism of Mangum which had existed in 1826 had subsided and in December upon the resignation of J. D. Toomer, Mangum was again elected as judge of the Superior Court. His stand within the dominant faction of state politics had not been impaired.

Although Mangum had been out of national politics since his resignation from Congress, he was eager to return to the national scene. In 1830 his thoughts turned to the Senate. His friends urged him to pursue this interest. In

³¹Ibid., p. 22.

³²William S. Hoffmann, "Origins of the Jackson Party" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1950), p. 189.

December, 1830, his name was presented to the legislature. The senatorial election which followed proved to be one of the bitterest in the history of North Carolina. The parties were divided into sectional and factional groups and were not bound together by political issues.

There was a tendency for the two stronger factions in North Carolina to unite. The dominant group with which Mangum was associated was headed by Mangum, Macon, Romulus M. Saunders and Richard Dobbs Spaight. The rival faction, which had been the group that had formed the People's party, was headed by Charles Fisher and Montford Stokes. The two factions by joining together hoped to control the offices of the state. The combination of the two factions was known as the "Spaight-Fisher faction," or just the "Spaight faction." The "Spaight faction" was fairly well organized and disciplined, and it had a slight majority in the legislature.

There were many independent politicians in the legislature who opposed the Spaight faction. They called themselves the "Independents," but they were as well disciplined as the "Spaight faction." Their leader, was Governor John Owen.

Mangum and John R. Downell, both members of the Spaight faction desired the position of Senator and Owen was the "Independents'" candidate. Some followers of Owen and Downell agreed to give their support to Mangum if their

own candidate could not win. Mangum's nomination was supposed to have been made by Hinton, a member of the "Independents," who hoped to unite both factions in favor of his friend, Mangum. Hinton delayed action. This resulted in Mangum's nomination being made by a member of the Spaight faction. The Owen men who had agreed at first to nominate Mangum were furious. For a while it seemed likely that Owen was going to win, but by a postponement and the "renewal of the friendly relations with Owen supporters."³³ Mangum came to victory on the seventh ballot. The vote stood: Mangum 103, Owen 84, scattering 8.³⁴ Mangum's resignation as judge of the Superior Court of Law and Equity was accepted three days after the election.

Mangum began his senatorial career in the twenty-second Congress of the United States. Shortly after his arrival in Washington Mangum received a letter from his old Negro teacher, John Chavis, which advised him to:

put on again, your full coat of Federalism, and not only support the election of Clay, but go forth to Congress with a full determination to support the renewal of the U. S. Bank.³⁵

Mangum's early Senate career was noteworthy. He made several speeches opposing the tariff and became known as a

³³McDuffie, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Shanks, op. cit., I, 413.

leading enemy of protection. He became friendly with Vice-President John C. Calhoun. He voted with Jackson's supporters generally and he and his Senate colleague from North Carolina, Bedford Brown, were among "Old Hickory's leading advocates. The issue of the national bank was not forgotten. In early 1832 events occurred designed to bring a test on the bank. This was to be a major question on which Willie P. Mangum would have to make a decision.

CHAPTER IV

REACTION TO THE BANK VETO

I think it is to be very much regretted that the U. S. Bank has come before Congress at this session [1832.]--I regard the continuance of that institution as of almost indispensable necessity-- . . . It is now more than doubtful whether it will [pass.] --and the whole may ultimately take the appearance of a trial of strength between Gen. Jackson & the Bank-- In that case, the Bank will go down--For Gen. J's popularity is of a sort not to slaken at present.¹

This was the feeling of Willie P. Mangum toward the bank at the beginning of 1832.

As a result of the war of 1812 the financial affairs of the nation had become very tangled. When the First Bank of the United States ceased to exist state banks increased in number. The banks were chartered by the state legislatures and were banks of issue as well as of deposit and discount. Bank notes circulated as money because there was not enough silver and gold circulating to supply the people's needs. As a result, the bank notes had wide varieties of value. This lack of uniformity brought about a number of complications.²

Many people felt that a national bank would help to untangle the currency situation. This bank would serve as a

¹Shanks, op. cit., I, 455-456.

²O. P. Chitwood, et. al. The United States From Colony to World Power (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1954) p. 223.

repository for government funds, an agency to supply the country with a sound and uniform currency by issuing notes, and would serve as a check on state banks by keeping their issues within safe limits. It was on this basis that Congress provided for the charter of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. This institution was not a true national bank. It was a banking corporation, located in Philadelphia, under private control, but possessed a unique and profitable relation with the government. The government had provided one-fifth of the capital of thirty-five million dollars. The Bank served as a repository of public funds, which it could use for purposes of its own without paying interest. It could issue bank notes up to the physical ability of the president and cashier to sign them: after 1827 it was able to move around this limitation by the invention of "branch drafts," which looked and circulated like notes but were actually bills of exchange. The Bank could not be taxed by the states and neither could a similar institution be chartered by Congress. In exchange for these privileges the Bank was to pay a bonus of one and a half million dollars, transfer public funds and make public payments without charge. The government was permitted to appoint five out of the twenty-five directors. If at any time the Secretary of the Treasury

considered the Bank unsafe the government could remove the deposits, provided the reasons were brought before Congress.³

The banking and currency question came to the front as a major issue during the first administration of Jackson. To the "Western farmers and eastern mechanics [the Bank was] the very citadel of tyrannical money power."⁴ The notes issued by the Bank "drove from circulation the paper currency of shaky institutions chartered by state politicians, thus inflaming village statesmen with anger against 'the rich and well-born.'" The Bank managers were accused of spending government funds for campaign expenses, contracting the currency to punish enemies and giving retainers for their speakers in Congress.⁵ Nicholas Biddle, President of the Bank of the United States, tried to keep his organization "'on sound business lines' through the maze of politics."⁶

In North Carolina the Clay partisans were vigorous supporters of the Bank of the United States. In the mid-1820's there had been ill feeling animosity toward the institution within the state.⁷

³A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1945), p. 74.

⁴Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), I, 556.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., I, 557.

⁷Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 52.

Henry Seawell in a letter to Mangum stated that the Bank of the United States was a subject of deep interest and "with the most intelligent part of the community, I think three-fourths are for it." The effect it had upon the currency in North Carolina, operating upon the local banks and forcing them to become able to redeem their notes, had placed the Bank "upon a footing of respectability . . . and none seemed to oppose it."⁸ Although before 1834 Mangum was a Jacksonian, his economic views were similar to those of Clay's partisans, such as Seawell.

On the national scene from 1818 until 1824 the Bank issue had been closely connected with Western demands for relief from bank foreclosures. General Jackson was, of course, also connected with this party strife and was against "printing-press banks," which had attempted to relieve the depression, but had not succeeded. As a result, the "Hero of New Orleans" was to some extent on the side of the Bank of the United States. In general, Jackson mistrusted all banks, including the Second Bank of the United States. According to Marquis James, Jackson's inconsistency toward the Bank amounted to this: in normal times he had opposed the bank's monopoly of the financial concerns of the United States, but

⁸Shanks, op. cit., I, 484.

in abnormal depression periods, he believed it to be a lesser evil than proletarian finance.⁹

In the presidential message to Congress in December, 1829, Jackson suggested that both the "legislature and the people" begin to consider whether another agency might not be devised to replace the Bank because it had "failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency."¹⁰ Although Mangum was not yet in the Senate he studied Jackson's message carefully.

Jackson's statements of opposition continued. In his second message to Congress he reiterated his opposition to the Bank and in his third message he stated that his views on the Bank "as at present organized were unchanged," after which he was willing to leave the matter to "an enlightened people and their representatives."¹¹ Some Congressional leaders believed that with the opposition Jackson had expressed toward the Bank in his first three messages the charter, which was due to expire in 1836, would not be renewed. Yet, other people misinterpreted Jackson's third message to mean that he would not veto a bill to recharter

⁹Marquis James, Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a President (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1937), p. 255.

¹⁰James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington: Authority of Congress, 1900), II, 462.

¹¹Ibid., II, 528 and 558.

the National Bank. Considerable pressure was brought on Jackson to accept a continuation of the National Bank.

Mangum, by then, had been elected to the Senate and he realized that he would have to act on the question of rechartering the bank. He was a politician who carefully considered all the political advice given to him from people of his home state. James Iredell, who had been a United States senator and governor of North Carolina, advised Mangum that:

. . . whether right or wrong, that Bank is at this time very popular in our State--I believe, indeed I know, it has done us vast good and as yet we have felt no evils from it--where is the check upon the State Banks, if not to be found here! I mean not theoretically but practically?¹²

Some Jacksonians favored the National Bank. Secretary of State, Edward Livingston, Secretary of the Treasury, Louis McLane, and William B. Lewis, a close personal friend and key advisor of the President, and other Jacksonians were favorable to it. These leaders felt that Jackson could be won over to the support of the Bank, if application for the recharter were not made until after the Presidential election. Their idea was that if a move for recharter were made in Congress the President would consider it a challenge and veto the bill.¹³ Mangum's feelings were similar and he hoped

¹²Shanks, op. cit., I, 472.

¹³Chitwood, op. cit., I, 455-456.

that the bill for rechartering would not be introduced until after the election.¹⁴

Mangum believed that the Bank had been gradually losing something of its popularity during the winter of 1831-32. He did not doubt that a bill in some form would pass both houses of Congress. In regard to the modification of the Bank's charter it was impossible to form more "than a vague conjecture." Mangum knew that the "whole of the South in the Senate, would be opposed to an extension of the Charter." Mangum declared, and continued, "I think, however, it may be safely stated that the Charter in some form will be extended" Mangum predicted the President would veto the bill, if it should be passed before the election. The North Carolina Senator believed the President abstained from conversation on the subject. Yet his opinion was strong that Jackson would not approve any law on the subject (the national bank) that might be passed during the winter. Mangum concluded, "If the Bill shall pass, and the President shall place his veto on it, I think it will greatly endanger the ultimate fate of that institution."¹⁵

¹⁴Shanks, op. cit., I, 455-456.

¹⁵Ibid., I, 480-481.

Before 1833 Mangum had not taken a definite stand on the question of the Bank. In January 1832, however, he had written William Gaston that he considered the Bank an "almost indispensable necessity."¹⁶ He believed that it would be rechartered if leaders would wait another year before proposing such a measure. Mangum expressed the belief that the recharter bill might take the appearance of a test of strength between Jackson and the Bank. Senator Mangum realized that if this became the situation, the Bank would go down. Mangum took this position because he felt General Jackson's popularity was not likely to lessen at that time.¹⁷ Spencer O'Brien advised Mangum "that people of the state were beginning to feel a good deal of solicitude on the result of the question of rechartering the U. S. Bank" and they would probably have a meeting on the subject.¹⁸ O'Brien had heard that Jackson would veto the bank bill and hoped that it was not true.

John Chavis, a free Negro teacher whose advice Mangum respected, urged the Senator to "put neck and shoulders" to the renewal of the charter[of the Bank]of the United States Bank, "for if you fail to do that, you will at once sever the bones & sinews of the nation--"¹⁹

¹⁶Ibid., I, 456.

¹⁷Ibid., I, 456 and 481.

¹⁸Ibid., I. 493.

¹⁹Ibid., I, 507.

S. F. Patterson, who was active in railroad developments and banking, expressed the opinion that he was "opposed to an extension of the present charter of the Bank of the United States," but his observation led him to believe that an "institution founded on similar principles [is] almost absolutely necessary for carrying on the financial operations of the Government with ease, convenience and safety." Patterson declared renewal of the charter was vitally important, but admitted that, "So far however as North Carolina is concerned, I conceive that we would be but little affected by it, either one way or the other--"20

A Jacksonian leader, William Montgomery, urged Mangum to support recharter providing certain revisions were made. Montgomery declared, "I am for a National Bank, to be under the Control of the Nation, Not of a Few Northern men whose Interest, and feelings are at points with ours of the South. . . ."21

In May of 1832 Mangum wrote his close associate Duncan Cameron that the question of renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States was before Congress and he predicted it would pass both branches and be vetoed. The veto, Mangum predicted, would ultimately be approved in the event of Jackson's election. Mangum wrote:

²⁰Ibid., I, 508-509.

²¹Ibid., I, 516.

I think it to be regretted that it is now pressed-- Political considerations however will urge it--& the danger lies, in the effect the veto may have, backed by the popularity of Gen. J. upon the passage of the Bill hereafter.²²

Duncan Cameron advised Mangum:

. . . the best Interest of U. States demand a prompt renewal of the Charter--delay (after it has passed in Congress) will produce pecuniary embarrassments exceeding in extent and degree all that can now be anticipated.-- If the President will at some time hereafter approve the Bill--he ought to do it at this time, disregarding all political considerations, or the necessity of political parties--it is a subject so deeply affecting the general welfare--that it should be regarded by itself only.²³

The pro-bank friends of Jackson did not control events. Instead, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and other leaders of the National Republicans who were in favor of acting immediately convinced Nicholas Biddle, President of the Second Bank of the United States, that he should act before the election. Therefore, application was made for renewing the charter, and a bill for the bank's recharter passed Congress in 1832.²⁴

Mangum represented a state which favored the continuation of the national bank. Yet in spite of this and of all the advice he had received on the recharter, he knew how popular "Old Hickory" was, and Mangum would not run the risk of opposing him on the measure. He, therefore, voted

²²Ibid., I, 548.

²³Ibid., I, 549.

²⁴Chitwood, op. cit., p. 261.

against the bank's recharter, believing all the time that the Bank question would come up again in the next Congress and would be passed. Of all political questions this is the one on which Mangum showed the least consistency. Judging him by his own statement, he was guided by what seemed to be politically expedient at the time.²⁵

Jackson returned the Bank bill to Congress with an uncompromising veto. "Old Hickory" declared, "The bank is trying to kill me, but I will kill it."²⁶ Nicholas Biddle viewed the veto as an object which "has all the fury of a chained panther, biting the bars of his cage."²⁷ The body of Jackson's message was an argument against the Bank's constitutionality. The social indictment of the bank was inclusive; it was monopoly, a grant of exclusive privilege; the whole American people were excluded from competition in the sale of the privilege, and the government thus received less than it was worth; a fourth of the bank's stock was held by foreigners, the rest by "a few hundred of our citizens, chiefly of the richest class." It was a menace to the

²⁵ McDuffie, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁶ James, op. cit., p. 302.

²⁷ Reginald C. McGrane, The Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), p. 196.

country's liberty and independence.²⁸ Mangum's vote was, as usual, with the majority against overriding the President's veto, and the recharter bill did not have enough supporters to become law.

In North Carolina the commercial interest favored the bank, and this attitude was reflected in Congress by the state representatives. Three of the four representatives voted for the charter. The two senators, Mangum and Brown, cast strict party votes against the bank. Mangum, however, voted against his convictions.²⁹

There were varied responses in North Carolina to Jackson's veto. George Howard, editor of the Tarboro Free Press wrote "Huzza! for Old Hickory!! Bank bill vetoed!"³⁰ Expressing the sentiment of the Old Republicans was Weldon Edwards who said that the veto "would shed [more] luster on his [Jackson's] fame than any other act of his life."³¹ Those politicians who had followed John Branch and professed to favor Jackson while opposing Van Buren were divided. The members of the Branch group who were opposed to the veto had another charge against Jackson and Van Buren. Those who supported the veto lost none of the hostility which they

²⁸Richardson, op. cit., II, 576-591.

²⁹Connor, op. cit., I, 516-517.

³⁰Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 53.

³¹Ibid.

previously had had. The original anti-Jackson forces were almost unanimously opposed to the action taken by the President. The New Bern Spectator and Literary Journal charged that Jackson had allowed the New York brokers and Van Buren to mislead his judgement which was naturally defective. Congressman Lewis Williams declared the veto to be the work of Martin Van Buren, who had been persuaded by New York financiers." He wrote that "without the national bank the whole South would be a tributary to New York."³²

Mangum received several letters telling him how much the people of North Carolina favored the bank. William Gaston agreed with Mangum that the bank was "an indispensable necessity," and declared:

I know that no [th]ing but this institution could have cured the pre[sent] money disease in No. Ca. and have a full conviction that if it be not upheld a state of things must ere long arise more extensively dangerous than what we have heretofore witnessed.³³

Another correspondent, William Polk, very frankly expressed great concern over the probability that the bank might not be rechartered. To Polk and to many other practical-minded men of business it was not a question of vague constitutionality or concern for the country. It was a clear cut

³²Ibid.

³³Shanks, op. cit., I, 460-461.

question of dollars and cents! Polk, as did many other wealthy men, owned stock in the Bank of the United States and he knew that if the bank were not rechartered the value of stock would drop. To them a failure of the bank to be re-chartered would mean a loss of money.³⁴

Thus well-to-do North Carolinians knew the bank was of real economic value to the people of the state. Although they did not immediately organize in defense of the bank they realized its loss would cost them money.

Toward the end of Jackson's first term his followers had been consolidated into a group known as the Democratic Party. The opponents of Jackson's vigorous measures were organized into a new party led by Henry Clay--The National Republican Party.³⁵

The Democrats were united on their choice of Jackson for the presidency, but they had to choose between several candidates for the vice-presidency. Martin Van Buren was finally nominated for the vice-presidency by the Democratic national convention in May 1832. Henry Clay and John Sergeant were chosen by the National Republicans for President and Vice-President respectively. The key issue in the campaign centered around the veto of the bank bill.³⁶

³⁴Ibid., I, 467.

³⁵Chitwood, op. cit., p. 262.

³⁶Ibid., p. 269.

In North Carolina and other Southern states the election centered around the vice-presidency. John Branch, Jackson's first Secretary of the Navy, had been asked to resign by Jackson following the ugly fight over the social status of Peggy Eaton. Branch wrote a series of letters blaming Van Buren for his removal and urging North Carolinians to join him in an anti-Van Buren party. Working with Mangum's friend, ex-Federalist James Iredell, and others, Branch organized a political party which nominated Jackson for president and Philip P. Barbour of Virginia for vice-president. Until the autumn of 1832 most of the National Republicans in North Carolina were working with Branch and were supporting the Jackson-Barbour ticket. The main issue in the state was not the bank, but Van Buren's alleged unfitness and his supposed championship of the tariff.³⁷

Mangum was frequently informed of the maneuvers of the supporters of Barbour by Iredell and was eventually accepted as an ally.³⁸ Yet he never broke off with the regular Democrats.³⁹ After the friends of John C. Calhoun in South Carolina succeeded in calling a convention which

³⁷William S. Hoffmann, "John Branch and the Origins of the Whig Party in North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Review XXXV (July, 1958) pp. 299-315.

³⁸Shanks, op. cit., I, 470-473.

³⁹Ibid., I, 515-517.

would nullify the tariff, the major issue of the election shifted from Van Buren's treachery to saving the Union. Since Branch, Iredell, and many of the leaders of the Jackson-Barbour group favored nullification, Democrats called a mass meeting, which denounced the Branch-Iredell group as "traitors," and proclaimed their loyalty to "Old Hickory" and the Union. The National Republicans whose support of the Jackson-Barbour group had caused much embarrassment now put an electoral ticket somewhat belatedly into the field and called for voters to cast ballots for Henry Clay and "save the Union."⁴⁰

Mangum hesitated. His personal sympathy was with the nullifiers, but he could judge political sentiment well enough to know it was not popular in North Carolina. At an Orange County Union meeting Mangum was forced to make a stand. He made a speech denouncing nullification, and reluctantly voted for Van Buren.⁴¹

One surprising thing about the election in North Carolina is the comparatively little attention given to the national bank. National Republicans disapproved of the bank veto, Jacksonians usually ignored it, but stressed their

⁴⁰Hoffmann, op. cit., pp. 54-57.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 53-54.

loyalty to the Union and attacked the nullifiers. Late in the campaign Barbour withdrew as a candidate in Virginia, hurting his chances in North Carolina and throughout the South. The final result in the state gave the Jackson-Van Buren ticket 21,007 votes, the Clay-Sergeant ticket 4,563 votes, and the Jackson-Barbour group 3,855 votes.⁴² This vote, however, cannot be considered any indication of North Carolinian's feelings toward the Bank of the United States.

In North Carolina as in other parts of the country the election proved to be a great personal victory for Jackson. In North Carolina alone he had carried sixty-three of the sixty-four counties. With his chosen running mate he carried fifty-six counties, fifty-four of them by majorities, and two by pluralities. Clay and Sergeant won only two counties, Guilford and Iredell.⁴³ Jackson carried the entire nation overwhelmingly.

Jackson took his victory to mean that the nation opposed the National Bank. He had won in the fight against the Bank. Moreover, he felt a personal victory in the outcome of the fight against the Bank. Jackson, however, realized that if the Bank were to terminate suddenly at the end of its charter, loans would be called in, in such large volume that a financial panic might result. "Old Hickory"

⁴²Ibid., p. 56.

⁴³Ibid.

decided to reduce the business of the bank gradually by having no more funds deposited in the bank and using the funds that were on deposit to meet current government expenses. Government deposits would be placed in certain state banks.⁴⁴ Most of all "Old Hickory" felt that the bank had tried to destroy him, and, instead, he would destroy it or die in the attempt.

⁴⁴Chitwood, op. cit., pp. 265-266.

CHAPTER V

JACKSON REMOVES DEPOSITS AND MANGUM SHIFTS HIS COURSE

. . . We are (your old Friends) More than Mortified at the Course you are taking in the Senate, and many severe anathemas are Made against you, and your Friends Reproached, For your Course, they all say you, were Elected by the Administration Men, and to support the Administration, and that you Have, gone over to our enemies; it is believed Here, that, the Majority of the Senate are determined to parilise the government, and thereby Make it unpopular, and it is useless to say What Feelings sutch a belief is Calculated to produce, Mr. Calhoun and Clay are now Considered as Inseperately allied associated and Bound together as the Simese twins, and Set out to distroy this government, or rule it.¹

William Montgomery, and other friends of Mangum were becoming greatly concerned over Mangum's action in the Senate.

As the year 1832 drew to a close Senator Willie P. Mangum felt "melancholy and lonely." He was "deeply mortified" at the public developments and irritated at what he called the "weak and foolish cabinet . . . deficient in talent and good practical sense."²

Mangum was uncertain of his own position at this time. He was still regarded as an ally and a leader of the regular Democratic party, but opponents of "Old Hickory" had not given up hopes that Mangum would reverse his stand, openly oppose the president, and lead their cause.³

¹Shanks, op. cit. II, 59.

²Ibid., I, 589.

³Ibid., I, 587.

The nation in late 1832 was torn by dissention. South Carolina's plan of nullifying the tariff created tenseness and a fear of civil war was widely felt. Mangum wrote his wife that he feared the nation would make war upon South Carolina.⁴ His friends became afraid that he had "caught the South Carolina epidemic."⁵ When forced to take a public stand toward nullification Mangum denounced it because he realized that the majority of North Carolinians considered it treason.⁶ Yet in his heart he stood with Calhoun and the South Carolina nullifiers.⁷ "Old Hickory" loved the union and hated John C. Calhoun. When he received official notification of South Carolina's action, he answered with a ringing proclamation, asserted the illegality of nullification or secession, and promised to save the union.⁸

In Mangum's home state little sympathy was expressed for the extreme position South Carolina's neighbor had taken. In the fall of 1832 the North Carolina legislature met and labeled nullification as "Revolutionary in character and subversive of the Constitution of the United States."⁹

⁴Ibid., II, 18. ⁵Ibid., I, 579.

⁶Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 54.

⁷Shanks, op. cit., p. 54.

⁸James, op. cit., pp. 314-315.

⁹Shanks, op. cit., I, 514.

Jackson next asked Congress for a force bill that would make special provisions for military action to enforce the laws.¹⁰ Mangum's reaction was strong. He honestly considered Jackson's anti-nullification proclamation "violent and dangerous in its principles."¹¹ Mangum wrote Priestly in December that he "would sooner resign than sanction the mad projects of the administration."¹² J. L. Bailey, a prominent law teacher in the state, advised Mangum not to resign. He explained, "Your countrymen will sustain you-- your feelings and sentiments are correct and will meet with a hearty response by many true Carolinians."¹³ Mangum explained to his wife that he was "opposed to harsh measures (referring to the force bill) and was planning to make a strong speech against the bill."¹⁴ Mangum worked diligently against the measure trying to have it postponed, but he did not make a significant speech against it.¹⁵

¹⁰William S. Hoffmann, "Andy Jackson Didn't Send Troops," Faculty Publications Appalachian State Teachers College, Boone, N. C., December Quarter, 1957, pp. 3-11.

¹¹Shanks, op. cit., I, 589.

¹²Ibid., I, 591.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., II, 18.

¹⁵Ibid.

Mangum, however, did make a strong speech in the Senate opposing the principle of a protective tariff. His correspondence indicated that this speech was well received in North Carolina. John Bragg, a member of the State Legislature from 1830-1834, wrote Mangum congratulating him on the stand he had taken against the tariff. Bragg said, "this single effort more than compensated for the anxiety and trouble experienced in effecting yr. election."¹⁶ In his speech Mangum took the position that the tariff was a sectional problem. He argued that the tariff was unfair because it fell more heavily on one area than it did another.¹⁷

Jackson felt the best means of solving the problem was to let the representatives of the people decide. Henry Clay then proposed a compromise tariff which was also accepted by John C. Calhoun.¹⁸ As part of a general plan of compromise in exchange for an agreement of certain Northerners not to oppose the compromise tariff, Mangum and all Southern Senators except one withdrew and did not vote on the compromise tariff.¹⁹ Thus because of the agreement both the compromise tariff and the force bill became law.

¹⁶Ibid., I, 505.

¹⁷Ibid., I, xxviii.

¹⁸William S. Hoffmann, "Andy Jackson Didn't Send Troops," Faculty Publications Appalachian State Teachers College, Boone, N. C., December Quarter, 1957, p. 10.

¹⁹Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 65.

The nullification controversy did not bring about a complete break with Jackson. Many good Southern Jacksonians including Mangum's colleague, Bedford Brown, also opposed the force bill. Brown wrote Mangum that he was "much gratified at the passage of Mr. Clay's bill to reduce the tariff." At the same time he regretted seeing that the "enforcing bill had passed, though the passage of the bill to reduce the tariff, will render it impractical and harmless. . ."²⁰

While Mangum's opposition to Jackson during the nullification crisis had not driven him into open opposition, it had increased his hostility toward "Old Hickory." When the nullification crisis ended, North Carolinians tended to lose interest in national politics and for approximately a year, local issues occupied an important place in the North Carolina legislature. Hopes ran high for internal improvements but the legislature failed to appropriate the necessary funds. There was also a demand for constitutional revision. A state banking policy continued to play a part in difference of opinion in various parts of the state. While North Carolina was debating the local issues Jackson was planning his attack on the bank.²¹

Shortly after the nullification crisis was over Jackson was ready to return to his temporarily postponed war on the

²⁰Shanks, op. cit., II, 25.

²¹Hoffmann, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

Bank of the United States. The law required that the federal government's funds be placed in the national bank unless the Secretary of the Treasury informed Congress in writing that the bank was unsafe. He then would be allowed to place the deposits in state banks. Treasury Secretary Louis McLane, a friend of the Bank, was unwilling to declare it unsafe. Jackson respected McLane and did not wish to remove him from office. Jackson persuaded the Secretary of State, Edward Livingston, to accept a position as Ambassador to France and promoted McLane to the post of Secretary of State. William J. Duane of Pennsylvania was given the position of Secretary of the Treasury. Mangum believed that Duane was appointed in order to declare the government's deposits unsafe and hence to remove them.²² Duane had not been told beforehand what was expected of him in his new position and "was stupid if he did not have a pretty clear knowledge of the situation."²³

Jackson wrote a letter of instructions to Duane suggesting that the deposits in the national bank be discontinued after September 15, 1833.²⁴ Jackson then pressed

²²Shanks, op. cit., II, 225.

²³John S. Bassett. The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 637.

²⁴James, op. cit., p. 346.

Duane for final action concerning deposits, and the Secretary of the Treasury still held that Congress should be consulted. In the meantime, Jackson told Roger B. Taney, who had served previously in the Cabinet as Attorney General, to be ready to take over the Department of the Treasury. Duane then announced that he would neither order the transfer of funds nor resign. Five days later Duane received a formal note of dismissal.²⁵ Duane's successor was Taney. Mangum, like other informed politicians, was aware of the reason for the maneuvering in the Treasury Department.

In a letter to Duncan Cameron, Mangum viewed the shifts of the secretaries in the Department of the Treasury with the certainty:

That the country is to be exposed to all the evil of a deranged currency for the next two or three years, & the pressure consequent upon destruction of confidence.--²⁶

Three days after Taney took over his new position he ordered that government funds from this time forth be deposited in specified state banks. There was immediate opposition to his action. Supporters and opponents of the bank were driven into solid formation. As a result, the Senate refused to confirm the nomination of Roger B. Taney as Secretary of the Treasury.²⁷

²⁵Bassett, op. cit., p. 644.

²⁶Shanks, op. cit., II, 73.

²⁷James, op. cit., p. 380.

In the North Carolina press Duane's removal created an uproar. The majority of the newspapers printed a letter Duane had written explaining that he had been removed because he had refused to declare the Bank unsafe. He hinted strongly that Jackson wished to remove the deposits for reasons of personal animosity toward the bank and that such a policy would wreck the country.²⁸ Frequently the editors expressed approval of Duane's sentiments and Mangum realized that this feeling existed.²⁹

Although Congress was not in session, Taney drew up a list of statements declaring the National Bank unsafe and began depositing federal funds in a few safe state banks, commonly referred to as "pet banks." Government withdrawals were made gradually from the Bank of the United States, and within a few months all government money had been withdrawn. Mangum received information that Jackson's course had few advocates.³⁰

In North Carolina the transfer of deposits caused considerable comment. Resolutions were introduced in the state legislature. A correspondent informed Mangum of a

²⁸Raleigh Register and N. C. Gazette, October 17, 1833.

²⁹Ibid., October 24, 1833.

³⁰Shanks, op. cit., II, 98.

resolution:

to Instruct and request Members, in Congress to go for a recharter of the U. S. Bank, should they be Called up, . . . There is Mutch Excitement Here about the general politics of the Country. . .³¹

A. W. Mebane wrote Mangum three days later in regard to the same resolution stating that "-it was laid on the table--to take a Van Winkle nap.--"³² In a letter to Governor David L. Swain, Mangum urged the supporters of the Bank of the United States to condemn the removal of deposits as unconstitutional rather than urge the less popular measure of recharter.³³

In his letter to Swain, Willie P. Mangum was secretly allying himself with the conservative forces in North Carolina. He was seeking alliance with a popular governor and taking his first definite stand as an enemy of Jackson's policy. He called himself an independent and referred to Jackson's supporters as "submissionists." The letter to Swain, however, was confidential and Mangum's position was still unknown. Swain accepted the alliance and informed Mangum that "no discreet man will venture to obtain an approval of Jackson's course with respect to the Bank."³⁴

In 1833 North Carolinians expressed general apathy and indifference to national politics, but this indifference

³¹Ibid., II, 59.

³²Ibid., II, 61.

³³Ibid., II, 53.

³⁴Ibid., II, 58.

was soon to change. When Congress began to debate the question of withdrawals in 1834, attention centered on the issue and state matters were almost forgotten.

Mangum received many letters concerning the withdrawal of deposits. Thomas B. Littlejohn, a justice of the peace in Granville County, saw the subject of the removal of the deposits as:

certainly the most atrocious, high handed, despotick measure, that ever was before assumed by the most absolute monarch, and unless it be counteracted by the prompt action of congress, its baneful efforts will speedily be manifested, by the most widespread ruin throughout our whole Country--I trust there is a sufficient amount of . . . patriotism in your great body to crush this monster in its infancy, and if the President should have the hardihood to interpose his veto, he ought to be immediately impeached.³⁵

Samuel Hillmann, Attorney General of North Carolina from Oxford, wrote to Mangum explaining:

Your friends are much gratified at the course which you have chalked out for yourself but they expect to hear from you in Congress more fully upon this interesting and important question [of the bank].³⁶

In a previous letter Hillmann had agreed with Mangum that the question was one of "law or no law, constitution or no constitution."³⁷

James Lea, a merchant of Caswell County, pointed out financial reasons for opposing removals, and explained that

³⁵Ibid., II, 72.

³⁶Ibid., II, 83.

³⁷Ibid., II, 82.

business would be severely damaged. The merchant pointed out that only since the establishment of a branch of the Bank of the United States at Fayetteville had North Carolina merchants been able to exchange local bank notes for northern currency in payments of debts without paying three to five per cent brokerage fees for exchange. The saving of this exchange fee enabled the merchants to lower the price to the consumer, as well as to make more profit.³⁸ This saving was a real factor to the business community, and anything that hurt the national bank endangered their prosperity and lessened their likelihood of profit. Merchants were not merely making partisan charges. The necessity of again paying the relatively high brokerage fees would be a real blow to their business and they were trying to influence Mangum for real economic reasons. As Lea told Mangum "There is no act of Gel. Jackson's publick life which has so great a tendency to impair his popularity as . . . the removal of the publick deposits."³⁹

Jackson's attack on the bank would destroy confidence and "ruin would be entailed upon thousands," Mangum was told.⁴⁰ John Chavis, a teacher and friend of Mangum's, in

³⁸Ibid., II, 96-97.

³⁹Ibid., II, 98.

⁴⁰Ibid., II, 101.

referring to Brown, who had upheld Jackson's stand, explained that "Mr. Brown ought to be at home grubbing or frying pancakes for his wife . . . instead of having a seat in the Senate of the United States."⁴¹ From Fayetteville Mangum received a memorial favoring the Bank of the United States and denouncing removal of the deposits. It was signed by 237 citizens "embrace[ing] among them many of the most influential & wealthy of our citizens, & many who I believe voted for the President of the United States."⁴²

Perhaps the most important letter Mangum received came from his brother. Priestly informed Willie that the "political heavens" were "ominous." Although Priestly still considered both himself and his brother, Willie, as Jackson men he declared, "the world is awfully governed by money." He said "the power of money is in the ascendant in N. C." and Mangum's support of the bank for a while would be approved. Soon, predicted Priestly, the money party would elect Swain to the Senate defeating Brown, and then "the same party" would turn around and elect Governor John Owen to the other Senate seat defeating Mangum. Priestly's letter indicated that Mangum could no longer be independent, going from one side to the other.⁴³

⁴¹Ibid., II, 103.

⁴²Ibid., II, 106.

⁴³Ibid., II, 89.

Mangum's decision could no longer be postponed. His brother's letter was probably the final straw in forcing him openly to desert Jackson. Priestly's letter caused him to believe that he could no longer survive in politics unless he became a champion of the "money power." Mangum, therefore, became an avowed champion of the Bank of the United States and an outspoken enemy of the Bank's great opponent Andrew Jackson. In becoming an enemy of Jackson, political expediency was not the sole factor in Mangum's change of course. His own economic views had long favored the bank. His correspondence indicated that the majority of North Carolinians did favor a national bank and the continuation of the Bank of the United States would be economically beneficial to North Carolina. His personal animosity to Jackson's anti-nullification measures had further decreased his desire to remain a Jacksonian. Therefore, all of these factors combined to make Mangum follow the course he did.

CHAPTER VI

LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

. . . this administration has put forward no principle as a test principle, as a party principle, except the principles of elections and of office. The administration came into power as a reforming administration to cut down abuses, lop off excrescences, restore economy, and bring back the government to a sound, simple and healthful action. The great questions before the country were -- tariff, internal improvements, and economy, and abuse of Executive patronage. I am bold to say, that not a single pledge, either expressed or implied, by the opponents of the late and the friends of the present administration, has been redeemed. This is a strong declaration. And yet I feel prepared, when invited to the trial, to prove it before the country.¹

These were the sentiments expressed by Mangum in a speech to the Senate on February 25, 1834. Although he had been elected to the Senate as a supporter of Jackson, he was now making a complete break and becoming a champion of the opposition.

The bank issue had played a very important part in Mangum's shift to the side of the opposition party, because of the fact that the bank had many supporters in North Carolina. Before 1833 Mangum had considered the bank an "indispensable necessity," but because he considered it politically expedient to remain a supporter of Jackson, he had voted against its recharter.² At that time the anti-Jacksonian party was not

¹Shanks, op. cit., V, 571-572.

²Ibid., I, 456.

very strong in North Carolina, but because of the attack on removals by the National Republicans, the nullifiers and Democrats, who were friends of the Bank, emerged as the Whig party, a much stronger group than the original National Republicans.³ Mangum was to become one of the key leaders of this party.

The new party made use of the doctrine of instructions to embarrass its political enemies.⁴ A number of the Whig resolutions were designed for the special purpose of embarrassing Senator Bedford Brown. On the days given for introducing petitions in the Senate, Senator Willie P. Mangum would introduce anti-removal petitions and call them instructions from the people of North Carolina.⁵ Mangum introduced a petition of this type on February 11, 1834 from Burke County. He announced his willingness to obey and asked Brown to do likewise or resign. In reply Senator Brown made the statement that he would obey instructions of the majority of the people in his state or resign. However, when the petition was read Brown declared that the resolutions came from members of the opposite political party and did not represent the attitude of the state, and that it had been the work of

³Hoffmann, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 74.

"partisan collection of bank men in a pot house . . . led by a disappointed politician." Burke County Whigs protested Brown's language, and Whig editors inferred that Brown had called his fellow citizens "pot house politicians" and the voice of his constituents "miserable petitions."⁶ Brown was denounced for not resigning or following instructions.

On March 27, 1834, many of the same anti-Jackson people from Burke County met again. They passed another set of resolutions. This time they condemned Senator Brown and his ally Senator Forsyth of Georgia for "approbations and disrespectful epithets cast upon them."⁷ They declared that Jackson had committed an unconstitutional act in removing the deposits from the Bank of the United States and in placing them in "certain favourite local banks" and thus "created embarisment distress and consternation throught the land. . . ."⁸ They praised Mangum for "his prompt and manly vindication" of the people present at their first meeting and "for the dignified and eloquent manner in which he exposed the encroachment of executive power."⁹ While Mangum was praised Brown was bitterly denounced. Brown was accused of ignoring the will of his constituents and of having greater respect for the Jackson machine than for the people he represented.

⁶Shanks, op. cit., II, 130.

⁷Ibid., II, 127.

⁸Ibid., II, 128.

⁹Ibid., II, 129.

Mangum received many complimentary letters expressing approval for the course he was pursuing in the Senate. Issac Avery, a lawyer from Burke County, wrote Mangum explaining that he had just received a sketch of the debate in the Senate on the introduction of the Burke resolutions and assured Mangum that his course met the approval of the community.¹⁰ A planter in Edgecomb County, Henry T. Clark, wrote Mangum saying that he could not:

omit this opportunity of adding a "well done" to your course as a North Carolina Senator. Disdaining the "shackles of party" at home and abroad you have acted as a highminded independent Representative of a Sovereign State . . .¹¹

Another correspondent, John W. Carson, praised Mangum for the work he was doing in the Senate in a letter which said:

I take pleasure in informing you that your speech on the Burke memorial is received by all who I have heard speak of it with praise and approbation. And I cannot but express to you that I feel proud that we have one from our State, who has the fearless [in]dependence to march forward in the vindication of principle, and the ability to sustain himself in the high honorable course which you have adopted--¹²

Public opinion seemed to be an important factor in the position Mangum took on a question. His position was usually with the majority regardless of the issue.

By the early part of 1834 Mangum had become recognized as the leader of the party opposing Jackson while his

¹⁰Ibid., II, 107.

¹¹Ibid., II, 121.

¹²Ibid., II, 136.

colleague, Brown, continued to support the President. Thus North Carolina's two senators became the recognized state leaders of two parties--the Whig and the Democratic.¹³ Public meetings within North Carolina supported or condemned the opposing stands of Mangum and Brown on the Bank. For the first time since Mangum had been in politics there were two definite national parties within the state. Each group proceeded to organize local and central committees. In the work of organization Mangum made a significant contribution to the Whigs. He was a genius for allaying prejudices and for settling differences.¹⁴

Shortly after the heated debate in the Senate on the Burke resolutions the voters of North Carolina went to the polls to elect representatives to Congress. One issue of the campaign centered around Brown's refusal to obey the Burke County instructions. Both the Democrats and Whigs talked of the election as serving to instruct senators. Most of the candidates took a clear stand on major issues of the day. They either supported the administration, opposed recharter of the Bank of the United States, and favored the re-election of Bedford Brown, or condemned removals, opposed the administration and opposed Brown's re-election.¹⁵ In previous

¹³Ibid., I, xxx.

¹⁴Ibid., I, xxxii.

¹⁵William S. Hoffmann, "Willie P. Mangum and the Whig Revival of the Doctrine of Instructions," The Journal Of Southern History, XXII (August, 1956), 344.

campaigns candidates had asked for re-election because they were friends or supporters of Jackson without very decisive effect, but the election of 1834 was an exception to the general rule. For the first time in North Carolina history, people voted for representatives to Congress primarily because of the stand which they took on national issues.

Mangum had been warned that the Whigs intended to replace Democratic Senator Bedford Brown with David L. Swain, and "then . . . a large portion of the same party will turn around and elect Gov. [John] Owen over you."¹⁶ In other words, political fence sitting was becoming dangerous indeed! The leaders of the Whig party had already decided that David L. Swain stood the best chance of defeating Brown. The personal popularity of Swain was great, and a number of Whig leaders felt that because of his stand for internal improvements within the state and for constitutional revision to favor the western part of the state, the independent Westerners would be led to support him instead of Brown. Swain became the only Whig candidate for senator. The Whigs often referred to the Democrats as "the Party," but nevertheless they underestimated the partisanship of their rivals. The Whigs' hope was for Western Democrats to support Swain, a man they pictured as nonpartisan. A newly established Democratic organ, the Raleigh Standard strongly advocated Brown's re-election.

¹⁶Shanks, op. cit., II, 89-90.

Even though the Western Democrats admired Swain they made it clear that they would not desert Democratic Senator Brown.

The Senatorial election began in the North Carolina legislature on November 20, 1833. House Democrats nominated Brown and at the same time pushed through a resolution for the balloting to begin immediately. The Whigs nominated Swain and tried to delay the election. Finally, Swain withdrew from the contest and agreed to stand for re-election as governor. Brown was re-elected as Senator and enough of the Western Democrats supported Swain to enable him to be re-elected as governor.

Shortly before the election Mangum had written Governor Swain requesting the governor to arrange for instruction to be sent to him urging him to support a bill for the annual distribution of proceeds from federal land sales. These proceeds were to be divided equally among the states. Mangum had twice voted against such a measure, but now regarded it as an issue which would help the Whig party overthrow the Democrats.¹⁷ In his inaugural address Swain implied that the most useful thing which the state legislature could do would be to instruct representatives and senators to support the

¹⁷William S. Hoffmann, "Willie P. Mangum and the Whig Revival of the Doctrine of Instructions," The Journal of Southern History, XXII (August, 1956), 345; and Shanks, op. cit., II, 54.

annual distribution bill. Swain was trying to arrange for the type of instructions which Mangum had requested a year earlier.¹⁸

Instructions were passed by the legislature, but not the kind Swain and Mangum wanted. As explained earlier, the first use of instructions had been made by the Whigs to embarrass political opponents. Now the Democrats were playing the same game. The Raleigh, North Carolina Standard hinted that since the Whigs had tried to eliminate Brown by instructions, the Democrats should retaliate by using the same weapon to eliminate Mangum.¹⁹

In February and March of 1834 the bank fight was at its height of fury. In the last part of December, Henry Clay opened the campaign against Jackson by introducing a resolution to censure Jackson for having removed the deposits. The Senate alone passed resolutions for the censure of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury for committing an unjustifiable and illegal act in removing the deposits from the national bank.²⁰ Mangum voted, as usual, with the

¹⁸Ibid., 344-345; and Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 75-78.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 78.

²⁰R. C. H. Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903), p. 335.

majority for the censure of the President.²¹ In a speech against the administration Mangum declared that all men except tools of Martin Van Buren regarded removals as the worst lawlessness in their memory.²² Bedford Brown, in a speech defending Jackson, accused Mangum of hypocrisy, of shedding his principles, of being a defender of the Bank of the United States and of misrepresenting the people of North Carolina.²³

To the action of censure by the Senate, Jackson replied with a protest in which he pronounced the resolution of the Senate as unconstitutional.²⁴ In North Carolina, Mangum and Brown were the leaders of two conflicting opinions concerning the action of the President and the Senate. The Whigs had the support of the stronger press at this time, and they followed the precedent set by Mangum. The Salisbury Western Carolinian called Jackson's action an attempt to establish dictatorial rule and likened the protest to a monarch's message from the throne.²⁵ The Jackson-Van Buren papers denied the right of the Senate to censure Jackson and condemned Mangum for desertion.

²¹Ashe, op. cit., V, 248.

²²Shanks, op. cit., V, 572.

²³Raleigh Register and North Carolina Gazette, March, 18, 1834.

²⁴Richardson, op. cit., III, 69-94.

²⁵William S. Hoffmann, "Willie P. Mangum and the Whig Revival of the Doctrine of Instructions," The Journal of Southern History, XXII (August, 1956), p. 342.

Nicholas Biddle, President of the Bank of the United States, still had hopes for it. He felt that forceful means would be necessary in order to promote a need for the bank. It had already begun to restrict its loans. These reductions were caused partly by the hostile relations that existed between the bank and the administration and partly by the alleged necessity of insuring the safety of the bank. As a result of the contraction of loans the panic of 1833-1834 was precipitated. This depression lasted for less than a year and conditions had returned to normal by the middle of the summer of 1834.²⁶ Jackson and his friends contended that it had been brought on by Biddle who wanted to discredit the administration and that it affected only speculators. There was a feeling that Biddle had reduced discounts to a greater extent than was necessary and public sentiment forced him to renew lending.²⁷ During "Biddle's panic," as it was sometimes called, Brown denied that any panic existed while Mangum made speeches blaming Jackson's removals for the distress.²⁸

In the early fall of 1834 the Washington Globe, which was at this time the national Democratic organ, called on North Carolina to instruct its senators to support the expunging resolution of Thomas Hart Benton. This resolution

²⁶Catterall, op. cit., pp. 326-329.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Hoffmann, op. cit., 71.

would have removed the censure of Jackson from the Senate records. As a result the Whigs were expecting the Democrats to introduce such a measure.²⁹ H. R. Alexander, a member of the North Carolina legislature, wrote Mangum:

Resolutions were introduced by Dr. [J. W.] Potts yesterday [November 28, 1834] one of them asserting the right on instruction--the other instructing you to expunge from Journals of the Senate--the Resolutions of Clay--charging that the President had acted--contrary to the Constitution-- and in derogation of the laws when he removed Mr. Duane and removed deposits--³⁰

For a number of years the right of the state legislature to instruct a senator had been an object of debate in North Carolina as well as in many other states. The Jacksonians believed that the right of the state legislature to elect senators carried with it the right to instruct them. They used the Bill of Rights and English history to support their belief. Furthermore, they felt Mangum had gone against the will of the state, and that the body which elected him should have the right to instruct him in his course of action.³¹

W. A. Graham and John Branch, members of the North Carolina legislature, were particularly good friends of Mangum and defended him. They argued that Mangum had not gone against the will of the people of the state, and that a vote

²⁹Ibid., p. 78.

³⁰Shanks, op. cit., II, 225.

³¹Ibid., II, 232.

for Thomas Hart Benton's resolution would be against the Constitution because Jackson had acted unconstitutionally by removing the deposits. There was a heated debate in the state legislature over the issue. The Democrats had a majority and the resolution of instruction was passed by the lower house 33 to 28.³²

Benjamin S. King informed Mangum that the resolutions of instructions are "Intended as a broad hint for you to resign. It seems to me that you are not bound to do the one or the other. That is to expunge or resign."³³ Henry Potter in a similar letter explained to Mangum that all his "political friends in this section of the State, and as far as I know or believe, throughout the State, expect you to remain at your post 'unmoved by party rage.'"³⁴

Mangum in a letter to William Graham explained that "It now remains for me to do my duty."³⁵ After that when Mangum received the resolutions he presented them to the Senators and stated that the legislature, was a servant of the people and, therefore, did not have authority to instruct him. Thus when Benton's motion to expunge Clay's resolution came up for a vote, Mangum announced that he would not vote. He explained:

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., II, 238.

³⁴Ibid., II, 263.

³⁵Ibid., II, 241.

Upon that subject I trust you will be assured, that it will cost me scarcely anything to perform that duty without the slightest reference to the consequences to me personally--Were I to consult either my pride or feelings I should resign forth with--But animated by the same spirit that threw me into the opposition to a great and hitherto irresistible power to popularity two winters ago, as well as the last; I stand prepared, and it cost me almost nothing to do my duty.

That the Senate presents the only barrier to an absolute power practically on the part of the Executive, I regard as certain.--That the Senate is to be subjugated by the reduction of Executive favor; or over awed by popular violence, is obvious--Nor is it less obvious that it is an object nearest to the heart of the President and many of his supporters.--³⁶

In another letter to Graham, Mangum further emphasized the fact that:

if I resign Jackson will be able to command the Senate in the next Congress.--If I stand firmly, the opposition will continue in the ascendancy in the next Congress.--³⁷

He believed that his resignation would cause other Whig senators to follow as they faced the same situation he did and as a result the Democrats would control the Senate.

Graham then informed Mangum that it was the desire of their friends that he should not resign until "after the August elections. When perhaps it will be indicated whether the State is irrecoverably lost."³⁸

Mangum became weary of fighting what seemed to him to be a hopeless battle. He expressed his feeling to Graham by saying:

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., II, 245.

³⁸Ibid., II, 273.

My anxious wish is to quit this unpleasant position--& yet I feel the strongest repugnance, & shrink from it as a fearful responsibility, to give my countenance, humble as it is, to a doctrine essentially revolutionary, and perhaps to be fatally disastrous.³⁹

Priestly Mangum tried to explain to his brother the sentiment within his home state by saying:

It is understood among us, that you have determined not seriously to regard the Instruction resolutions; and your personal and political friends are all so far as I know or have heard, well pleased with your determination. It is believed that those resolutions, were not, by any means, a fair or just expression of the will of the State.⁴⁰

Other correspondents congratulated Mangum for not allowing himself to be "instructed out of the Senate" and praised him for raising his hand and voice against "executive misrule." They felt he would be stronger by retaining the position as Senator and making war upon those who had been critical of his actions.⁴¹

Samuel Hillmann, an attorney from Oxford, had been greatly concerned with the rapidly changing events in Washington and wrote Mangum:

What will be the consequence of the present high handed and lawless measures God only knows--United States Bank notes are equivalent to gold and Silver coins and therefore our Legislature have said substantially that stock in the newly created banks may be subscribed for in these notes--But Mr. Brown by swelling and fulminating eternally,

³⁹Ibid., II, 260.

⁴⁰Ibid., II, 303.

⁴¹Ibid., II, 296 and 305.

nolens, volens, against the U. S. Bank he [is] trying to ape his great prototype Genl. Jackson and because his Master has repealed an act of Congress, he is trying to repeal an act of our Genl. Assembly--The public here Sir look to you and those of their representatives who think with [you] to strain every nerve in defence of the country. The course which you have pursued meets with the most cordial approbation of all parties.⁴²

By May 22, 1836, Mangum had become extremely discouraged with the situation in Washington and wrote his wife that "I am sick and tired of my daily attendance on Congress--The business is dull and uninteresting, and everything is going wrong, and almost to ruin."⁴³

In September of the same year Mangum had definitely made up his mind to resign if the election went against the Whigs. The first returns from the election indicated the Whigs had a majority. However, final returns proved that neither party had control of the legislature. Shortly after the election two Whigs died, and a special election was held. Two Democrats won, and this gave them control of the legislature.⁴⁴ Mangum felt the election confirmed his determination to resign and on November 23, 1836, almost two years after the instructions had passed, he sent his resignation to two members of the state senate, Hugh Wadell and W. A. Graham, and in turn asked that it be handed to the Speaker of the Senate.⁴⁵

⁴²Ibid., II, 115.

⁴³Ibid., II, 437.

⁴⁴Ibid., II, 474.

⁴⁵Ibid., II, 479.

Senator Mangum had indeed proven himself to be a very chameleon-like figure in politics. The North Carolina Standard declared that Mangum:

has been Federal and anti-Federal; Jackson and anti-Jackson; Calhoun and anti-Calhoun; Clay and anti-Clay; Nullifier and anti-Nullifier, Bank and anti-Bank; . . . Instructionist and anti-Instructionist. In a word there is hardly a respectable politician of the State old enough to have been associated with him ten years or more, who cannot remember the period when Mr. Mangum has been upon his side and upon the other also.⁴⁶

⁴⁶J. G. DeRoulhac Hamilton, Party Politics in North Carolina (Durham: The Seeman Printery, 1916), p. 72.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Willie P. Mangum has been described by historians as one of the most chameleon-like figures in North Carolina politics. As a politician he was guided by his convictions as to what seemed politically expedient at the time. He was influenced by public opinion in his state and the advice of his friends and this usually persuaded him to go with what he thought was the majority opinion in North Carolina.

Prior to the early part of 1834 it was politically expedient for ambitious North Carolina politicians to be supporters of Andrew Jackson. Mangum had joined the Jackson party along with most of the "Old Republicans" when they were forced to choose sides between Jackson and Adams.

While Mangum was a Jackson supporter he was elected to the United States Senate by the people of North Carolina, even though he personally favored the United States Bank. In 1832 it did not seem to him that it was politically expedient to break with Jackson so he twice voted against the bank's recharter. He also personally opposed Jackson's nationalistic stand during the nullification crisis, but again because it was not politically wise to do so he did not openly break with Jackson. By the end of 1833, however, the situation had changed.

The conservatives in North Carolina were thoroughly aroused against Andrew Jackson by the beginning of 1834. Jackson's transfer of deposits from the United States Bank had convinced them that the President was out to destroy a valuable institution. They constantly pled with Mangum to oppose Jackson's policy, and convinced Mangum that they were completely serious about this matter and that he could no longer remain a leader in politics if he ignored their wishes. The most convincing statement Mangum received was a letter from his brother informing him that the "power of money is in the ascendant" and that it would not be long before "the money power" would turn against Mangum and defeat him. Thus Mangum changed his course and became a champion of the Bank and an opponent of Jackson.

Real economic motives caused the commercial interest of the state to support a national bank and to form a party that would champion it. Most important to the people of North Carolina was the problem of exchange. As long as the national bank remained in existence, North Carolina merchants could very easily and cheaply exchange local bank notes for national bank notes which would circulate any place in the country at full value. They realized that if the national bank went out of existence they would have to pay three to five per cent brokerage fees. Aside from this many prominent men owned bank stock, and there was a general feeling among

conservatives that the Bank of the United States had a tendency to keep business on a sound basis and to hold inflation in check. Therefore, the conservatives wrote Mangum many letters, and brought tremendous pressure to bear upon him and organized a new party devoted to the Bank of the United States. This action of the conservatives caused Mangum's shift and it was based on actual economic beliefs.

Hoffmann's conclusion that the Bank issue was "political and emotional, not economic" is not completely accurate. Charles G. Sellers in his review of Hoffmann's book concluded correctly when he stated that economic factors were significant. There was much in the Bank war that was emotional or partisan but the economic factors were there also and these factors were most significant in causing Mangum to support the Bank and oppose Jackson.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

- Bassett, John Spencer (ed.). "Some Unpublished Letters of Nathaniel Macon," An Annual Publication of Historical Papers. Durham: Historical Society of Trinity College, 1906.
- Boyd, William K. (ed.). "Selections from the Correspondence of Bedford Brown-I., 1832-1856," An Annual Publication of Historical Papers. Durham: Historical Society of Trinity College, 1906.
- McGrane, Reginald C. (ed.). The Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919.
- McPherson, Elizabeth G. "Unpublished Letters From North Carolinians to Van Buren," The North Carolina Historical Review, XV (January, April, 1938).
- Richardson, James D. Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 10 vols. Authority of Congress, 1901.
- Shanks, H. T. (ed.). The Papers of Willie P. Mangum. 5 vols. Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1950.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

- Ashe, S. A. Biographical History of North Carolina. 7 vols. Greensboro: C. L. Van Noppen, 1905.
- Bassett, John Spencer. The Life of Andrew Jackson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
- Beard, Charles A. The American Party Battle. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
- Beard, Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

- Bowers, Claude G. The Party Battles of the Jackson Period. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922.
- Catterall, Ralph C. H. The Second Bank of the United States. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1902.
- Chitwood, O. P. et al. The United States From Colony to World Power. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1954.
- Connor, R. D. W. North Carolina: Rebuilding an Ancient Commonwealth. 4 vols. Chicago: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1929.
- Faulkner, Harold U. American Political and Social History. New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, Inc., 1957.
- Hamilton, H. G. De Roulhac. Party Politics in North Carolina 1835-1860. Durham: The Seemen Printery, 1916.
- Henderson, Archibald. North Carolina: The Old North State and the New. Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1941.
- Hoffmann, W. S. Andrew Jackson and North Carolina Politics. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1958.
- Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.
- James, Marquis. Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a President. New York: The Babbs-Merrill Company, 1937.
- Lefler, Hugh T. and Albert Ray Newsome. The History of a Southern State: North Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954.
- Newsome, Albert Ray. The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Age of Jackson. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1945.
- Sellers, Charles Grier, Jr. Jacksonian Democracy. Washington: American Historical Association, 1958.
- Sellers, Charles G. James K. Polk: Jacksonian. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

- Smith, Charles W., Jr. Roger B. Taney: Jacksonian Jurist. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1936.
- Stanwood, Edward. A History of the Presidency From 1788 to 1897. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.
- Sumner, William G. Andrew Jackson. New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899.
- Swisher, Carl Brent. Roger B. Taney. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935.
- Turner, Frederick Jackson. The United States, 1830-1850. New York: Henry Holt Company, 1935.
- Van Deusen, Glyndon G. The Jacksonian Era. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959.
- Whitener, Daniel J. North Carolina History. Chattanooga: Harlow Publishing Corporation, 1958.

C. PERIODICALS

- Boyd, William K. "Federal Politics in North Carolina, 1824-1836," South Atlantic Quarterly, XVIII (January-April, 1919).
- Hoffmann, W. S. "John Branch and the Origins of the Whig Party in North Carolina," The North Carolina Historical Review, XXII (August, 1956).
- Hoffmann, W. S. "The Election of 1836 in North Carolina," The North Carolina Historical Review, XXXII (January, 1955).
- Sellers, Charles G. "Book Reviews," Journal of Southern History, XXV (January, 1959).
- Sellers, Charles G. "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" American Historical Review, LIX (January, 1954).

D. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Hoffmann, W. S. "Origins of the Jackson Party." Unpublished Master's Thesis, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1950.

E. ARTICLES IN COLLECTIONS

Boyd, W. K. "Currency and Banking in North Carolina," Historical Papers. Durham: The Seemen Printery, 1914, pp. 52-86.

Hoffmann, W. S. "Andy Jackson Didn't Send Troops," Faculty Publications. Boone: Appalachian State Teachers College, 1957, pp. 3-11.

McDuffie, Penelope. "Some Chapters in the Life of Willie Person Mangum," Historical Papers. Durham: The Seemen Printery, 1925, pp. 5-54.

F. NEWSPAPER

Raleigh Register and North Carolina Gazette. October 17, 1833 and March 18, 1834.